Proposed ACM Position on Voting Systems

Virtually all voting systems in use today (punch-cards, lever
machines, hand counted paper ballots, etc.) are subject to fraud and
error. While computer-based electronic voting systems have the
potential to improve the electoral process, electronic voting systems
are not without their own risks and vulnerabilities. In particular,
many electronic voting systems have been evaluated by independent,
generally-recognized experts and have been found to be poorly
designed; developed using inferior software engineering processes;
designed without (or with very limited) external audit capabilities;
intended for operation without obvious protective measures; and
deployed without rigorous, scientifically-designed testing.

To protect the accuracy and impartiality of the electoral process, ACM
recommends that all voting systems - particularly computer-based
electronic voting systems - embody careful design, strong safeguards,
and rigorous testing in both their design and operation. In addition,
voting systems should enable each voter to inspect a physical (e.g.,
paper) record to verify that his or her vote has been accurately cast,
and to serve as an independent check on the result produced and stored
by the system. Making those records permanent (e.g., not based in
computer memory) provides a means by which an accurate recount may be
conducted. Ensuring the reliability, security, and verifiability of
public elections is fundamental to a stable democracy. Convenience and
speed of vote counting are no substitute for accuracy of results and
trust in the process by all the electorate

Background:

Government election officials in the U.S. and other countries are
turning to computer-based electronic voting (evoting) systems to
replace outdated punch card and lever machines in the conduct of
public elections. Election officials have found that evoting systems
offer significant improvements over punch cards and lever machines as
they are more accessible to voters with special needs; can be easier
to use; and can decrease the amount of time needed to tally votes.
However, many evoting systems are paperless and do not produce a
physical record of each voting transaction, a record that can be
verified by the voter or that can be used to reconstruct election
results from the original records.

Proponents of Requiring Physical Records

In four published reports, independent computer scientists have
demonstrated that evoting systems can be vulnerable to programming
error, equipment malfunction, and/or malicious tampering. While
standard inspections and testing processes can identify a number of
obvious problems, evoting systems vendors prevent the public
disclosure of the inner-workings of their hardware and software, as
well as the results of voting system certification tests.

An organization founded by Stanford University computer science
professor David Dill has concluded that an "audit gap" exists that
prevents the detection and disclosure of any accidental or deliberate
flaw in evoting systems. They advocate the use of a paper-based
"voter-verifiable audit trail" as a solution. To review more
information, see: http://www.verifiedvoting.org/drefaq.asp

Opponents of Requiring Physical Records

Evoting systems vendors and their trade associations have dismissed
security concerns and contend that their paperless evoting systems are
secure. Vendors contend that their products are independently tested
and must meet certain Federal requirements and conform to certain
state certification processes. Voting rights groups contend that
evoting systems can be much better than the punch card voting machines
and lever machines that they are replacing. Representatives of
disabled and visually impaired voters promote the use of evoting
systems because of the enhanced features and usability they provide.
In summary, vendors and voting groups have concluded that requiring
evoting systems to provide a paper record is unnecessary and will
serve to discourage individuals from voting. To review a joint
statement of groups opposed to voter verifiable paper records see:
http://www.aapd.com/dvpmain/pollaccess/principlevote.html

ACM Wants to Hear From You

The ACM Council is being asked to adopt an association-level ACM
policy position on the issue of requiring electronic voting systems to
produce a physical record. In considering its position, the ACM
Council encourages all members to provide feedback.